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Abstract
Our article investigates political engagement among youth with and without an immigration background. Tapping to cur-
rent debates on intergenerational assimilation processes in Europe, we look at differences in levels of political interest
between immigrants, children of immigrants and natives. In particular, we argue that such differences are a function of
respondents’ identification with the receiving society. We predict that among respondents with an immigrant background
higher levels of national identification will be positively correlated with political interest. Among natives, political interest
will not depend on levels of national identification. These expectations reflect the ideas of the social identity perspective
according to which group identification increases adherence to group norms and adherence to norms is stronger among
individuals who suffer from identity uncertainty. We test our model in four European countries: England, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Sweden, using data from the CILS4EU project. Our findings indicate that interest in the politics of the
survey country differs between respondents with and without an immigrant background. Respondents with an immigrant
backgroundwho also have a strong national identification aremore likely to report a political interest than natives. Respon-
dents with an immigrant backgroundwho have a low national identification, are less likely to report a political interest than
natives. The findings also reveal that political discussions at home and associationism positively predict political interest
whereas girls show significantly lower odds to be politically interested.
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1. Introduction
Political interest indicates “the degree to which politics
arouses a citizen’s curiosity” (van Deth, 1990, p. 278).
It is often understood as one of the main determi-
nants of political participation (Milbrath, 1965, p. 40;
Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 334), also for
young people (García-Albacete, 2014), and as a prereq-
uisite for an active and democratic citizenry (i.e., van
Deth & Elff, 2004, p. 478). Whether young people de-
velop political interest or not is particularly critical for
their future as active (or inactive) citizens. Political in-
terest has been found to develop during young adult-
hood, particularly during the so-called “formative years”
(Kinder & Sears, 1985; Verba et al., 1995) and to be
remarkably stable over the lifespan (Neundorf, Smets,
& García-Albacete, 2013). For that reason, adolescence
and young adulthood are key periods to study political
interest. Corroborating the relevance of this period, pre-
vious research indicates that individuals who develop
Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 257–278 257
a taste for politics in adolescence will be more politi-
cally engaged in adulthood (GrecoMorasso, 2012; Prior,
2010). Active political engagement, at the same time,
can be understood as an important civic norm in democ-
racy and a central quality of citizens’ ideal of “good citi-
zen” (van Deth, 2009).
Despite its relevance as an indication of social inte-
gration and a future active citizenry, the development
of interest in politics among young people with an im-
migrant background has rarely been examined. One ex-
ception in this regard is the PIDOP project, in which
Kim and Amnâ (2015) for example, compared Iraqi and
Kurdish immigrants and natives in Sweden. Using a small
and non-random sample (N = 538) of young adults
aged 16 to 26 years, the authors find no differences be-
tween the two immigrant groups and the natives (Kim &
Amnâ, 2015, p. 257). Fernandes-Jesus, Malafaia, Ribeiro,
and Menezes (2015) compared Portuguese natives and
Brazilian and Angolan immigrants in Portugal. With a
slightly larger yet non-random sample, they report that
Portuguese youth shows a significantly higher interest in
politics compared with the two migrant groups.
In the current study, we too focus on political interest.
Complementing existing work, we investigate the emer-
gence of interest in the politics of the “receiving” coun-
try in particular and estimate differences between na-
tives and immigrants as well as differences between na-
tives and children of immigrants, thus exploring political
assimilation trends. Following Alba and Nee (1997) we
define assimilation as “the decline and at its endpoint
the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the
cultural and social differences that express it” (Alba &
Nee, 1997, p. 863). In addition, we test whether differ-
ences in political interest are moderated by levels of na-
tional identification.
In our investigation, we also control for respondents’
friendship and language preferences as well as addi-
tional factors associated with immigrants’ assimilation.
Following political behavior theories, we further include
several predictors of political interest in the analysis.
Parental transmission, that is, the frequency of political
talk within the family while an individual was a child,
has been repeatedly found to be among the most impor-
tant predictors of political interest (Neundorf et al., 2013;
Prior, 2010; Terriquez & Kwon, 2015). Parents influence
their children’s political engagement both through their
social status, and their interest, engagement and partici-
pation style (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009). Jennings
et al. (2009) further show that growing up in a politicized
family, in which politics is often discussed, is also a good
predictor of an early development of political interest as
well as other political orientations. Not only the parents
but also peers, the school, and other institutions con-
tribute to the political engagement of youth (Quintelier,
2015). The contribution of peers to political engagement
is particularly large among young people who have not
developed a political interest at home (García-Albacete,
2013; Neundorf, Niemi, & Smets, 2016).
The relationship between national identification
and political interest has thus far gained surprisingly
limited attention from immigration research (Hindriks,
Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2017). One reason for this la-
cuna is surely the fact that the causal relations between
the two concepts are difficult to disentangle. In this ar-
ticle, we do not attempt to solve this debate. Relying
on the Social Identity Theory (SIT), we maintain instead
that identification shapes political interest and not the
other way around. Specifically, we contend that national
identification shapes the probabilities of immigrants and
children of immigrants to express interest in politics and
moderates the effect of having an immigrant background
on political interest. Analytically, we are however unable
to exclude the possibility of reversed causality.
Our study makes the following contributions: (1) we
investigate differences between natives and immi-
grants, as well as between natives and children of im-
migrants, utilizing data from four different European
countries. Pooling these countries together we have suf-
ficient data to estimate logistic regression models for
this purpose, with a wide set of control variables; (2) to
avoid mixing interest in the politics of the receiving so-
ciety with interest in the politics of a respective country
of origin, we focus specifically on the former; (3) refer-
ring to the SIT we propose a mechanism that may clar-
ify the emergence of differences in political interest be-
tween natives, immigrants and children of immigrants.
Specifically, we test for a moderation of national identi-
fication in the relations between immigrant status and
political interest.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Political Engagement: An Intergenerational
Assimilation Process?
Since very early on, researchers maintained that assimi-
lation is an intergenerational process (e.g., Gans, 1979;
Liberson, 1973). However, while some scholars maintain
that assimilation increases over generations (Alba &Nee,
1997; Gans, 1992), others are of the opinion that this is
not necessarily the case (e.g., Zhou, 1997). Indeed, pro-
ponents of the segmented assimilation theory in North
America showed that children of immigrants are unable
to narrow the structural gap with peers who are not chil-
dren of immigrants. They also report that in some immi-
grant groups, the offspring often hold on to their cultural
heritage and ethnic identification (Portes & Rumbaut,
2001). Studies on assimilation in Europe to themost part
failed to indicate a process of segmented assimilation
and seem to support the idea that assimilation intensi-
fies over generations (see, e.g., Diehl & Schnell, 2006;
Hochman, 2010; Kalter, 2018).
In line with the classic assimilation theory, previous
studies report that among immigrants, the longer they
stay in the receiving society, the stronger is their polit-
ical engagement (Bass & Casper, 2001; Messina, 2006;
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White, Nevitte, Blais, Fournier, &Gidengil, 2006). Looking
at electoral behavior, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade
(2001) find a similar pattern, with the exception
of Latinos, in most other migrant minorities in the
USA comparing immigrants and immigrant descendants.
Bevelander and Pendakur (2011) report the same for
Sweden. Lien (2004) also studied generational differ-
ences in voting participation among immigrant minori-
ties in the US. She reports an altogether different pic-
ture according to which being foreign-born is not as-
sociated with lower voting probabilities among regis-
tered (eligible) individuals. However, the need for regis-
tering is a known source of inequality in elections, which
would point to the role of resources (and not motiva-
tions) in casting a vote. These and other studies stress
differences not only between individuals with an immi-
grant background and without, but also between immi-
grants and immigrant offspring or children of immigrants
(e.g., Monforte & Morales, 2018). In our own study we
thus look at three groups: natives (individuals without
an immigrant background), immigrants (who are foreign-
born), and children of immigrants.
2.2. National Identification as a Key Factor for Young
Immigrants’ Political Assimilation
National identification is a form of social identifica-
tion that is identification with a specific social group.
According to the SIT, individuals identify with a so-
cial group to secure a positive self-concept (e.g., Tajfel,
1974). Social identity is based on processes of self-
categorization, evaluation, and identification. Our inter-
est in national identification derives not only from its
importance as a meaningful dimension of assimilation.
Identification processes have generally been known to
intensify in adolescence (e.g., Erikson, 1968). In this pe-
riod, individuals are more engaged in reflections on who
they are, which in turn helps them realize their agency as
individuals, and develop tools to cope in the social world
(Phinney, 1990; Schwartz, Coté, & Jensen Arnett, 2005).
The social identity perspective maintains that
ingroup-identification increases individuals’ motiva-
tion to act in the name of this group (Huddy, 2001;
Turner, 1999). The self-categorization theory specifically
stresses that self-categorization involves the compari-
son of the self to the prototype of the respective in-
group and accentuates perceived prototypical similarity
between self and ingroup, which prescribes the behav-
ior of the groups’ members (Hogg, Hardie, & Reynolds,
1995). Accordingly, Simon and Klandermans (2001)
stress that collective identification is associated with self-
stereotyping and conformity processes. Identification
with any social group is therefore associated with higher
congruence with its norms, orientations, values and be-
liefs (Klandermans, 2014). In the context of political inter-
est, we thus assume that stronger national identification
implies a stronger need to adhere to the group’s norms
(Hogg & Reid, 2006). Interest in the politics of the na-
tional group can be understood as a demonstration of
such compliance and adherence.
Interestingly, Hogg et al. (1995) maintain that the
need to comply with the ingroup’s norms depends
on how prototypical and uncertain individuals feel
about their membership in that ingroup (see also
Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). Given their position in-
between the heritage and the receiving society, individ-
uals with an immigrant background (hereafter IIBs) are
likely to feel more uncertain about their membership in
the national majority compared with natives. For this
reason, we predict that IIBs will be more interested in
the politics of their receiving society the stronger their
national identification is. This idea echoes the work of
Simon et al. (1998) who maintain that political participa-
tion is sometimes used to fulfil identity needs (see also
Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008).
In light of these theoretical considerations, in what fol-
lows we will test the following hypotheses:
H1: Immigrants will show a lower interest in politics
compared with natives;
H2: Children of immigrants will show lower inter-
est in politics compared with natives, however, dif-
ferences between these groups will be smaller com-
pared to the difference found between immigrants
and natives;
H3: Among IIBs, the stronger they identify with the
survey country, the more likely they will be to be in-
terested in this country’s politics.
3. Data, Variables, Analysis
Weuse data from the CILS4EU project (Kalter et al., 2017)
collected eight to nine years ago. On the one hand, this
datamay be somewhat outdated. On the other hand, we
are unaware ofmore recent publicly available datawhich
focuses on young IIBs in Europe froma cross-national per-
spective that has a similar quality and asks directly about
interest in the politics of the receiving society. Most of
the variables we use were collected during the second
wave of the project (2011–2012) when the mean age of
the respondents was about 16 (standard deviation 0.66).
In addition, we reach back to the first wave (2010 and
2011) to include respondents’ subjective perceptions of
discrimination and their country of origin. We also use
parents’ information for some robustness checks, as de-
scribed below. The dependent variable in our analysis is
interest in the politics of the survey country, measured
as: 1 “quite a lot, a lot, or very much interested” and 0
“a little, very little, or not at all interested.” We recoded
the original 5 points scale of this variable because it was
skewedwith about 55% of the respondents reporting be-
ing very little or not at all interested or a little interested.
This standard indicator of political interest used in
surveys has been criticized for imposing a specific view
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of what politics is, mainly related to the electoral pro-
cess and representative institutions, and therefore for
being biased towards adults (i.e., O’Toole, Lister, Marsh,
Jones, & McDonagh, 2003) and towards men’s interest
(Ferrín, Fraile, García-Albacete, & Gómez, 2019). The re-
sult being that it would underestimate young people’s
and women’s interest in politics. Unfortunately, such
criticisms, mainly qualitative, have not yet resulted in
methodological proposals that are used in standard sur-
veys to better measure young people’s political interest.
Notwithstanding these measurement issues, political in-
terest has been found to be a good predictor of polit-
ical participation for both young people and for adults
(García-Albacete, 2014) and has provided a reliable mea-
sure of future political engagement over time and across
countries. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect that
it performs worse for some groups among young people
than for others.
Our interest lies mainly in the independent variable
immigrant status (native, immigrant, and child of immi-
grant[s]) and national identification, as well as the in-
teraction between these two variables. Immigrant sta-
tus is measured based on the generated generation vari-
able included in the CILS4EU data (Dollmann, Jacob, &
Kalter, 2014). We transformed this generated variable to
include three groups: immigrants are respondents who
reported to be foreign-born; children of immigrants are
respondents whose parents (at least one) are foreign-
born; and finally, the rest of the respondents, includ-
ing respondents with one or more foreign-born grand-
parents, were classified as natives (see Table A1 in the
Appendix). We also tested an alternative model in which
grandchildren of at least two foreign-born grandparents
were coded together with children of immigrants. The
results (presented in Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix)
show that the main findings are robust. In any case, the
number of third-generation immigrants in the sample
was very small ranging between 6% in England and 2%
in the Netherlands.
National identification was measured with the ques-
tion of how strongly respondents feel English, German,
Dutch or Swedish, respectively. Answers ranged from 1
“not at all strongly” to 4 “very strongly.” Due to the skew-
ness of this variables’ distribution, we grouped the first
and second response categories of this variable together.
In measuring national identification in this manner, we
deviate from previous studies that maintained that po-
litical engagement of immigrants depends on their eth-
nic as well as national identification, and not only the lat-
ter (e.g.,Martinovic&Verkuyten, 2014; Simon&Grabow,
2010; Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013). We decided to
focus on this form of identification because we think it is
national and not ethnic identification that may increase
respondents’ interest in the political sphere of their soci-
ety and engage in it. Empirically, the CILS4EU data asks re-
spondents whether they identify with the survey country
and whether they identify with a different group in two
separate items. Although one could construct an inte-
gratedmeasure from these items, this measure does not
fully capture the notion of dual identity. We thus chose
to estimate the effect of ethnic identification which cor-
relates negatively with national identification (Pearson’s
r = −0.45) independently. Ethnic identification is mea-
sured by items asking respondents whether or not they
identify with a group other than their survey country,
and if so, to what extent. We combined these two items
into one scale ranging from 0 “does not identify with an
additional group” to 3 “identify very strongly with an-
other group.”
In addition to ethnic identification, we include in our
models several control variables. In terms of assimilation
related predictors, we first control for perceived discrim-
ination, measured with a variable asking “How often do
you feel discriminated against or treated unfairly?” in
four different scenarios (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
We recoded the sum of the reports across all contexts
into two categories: Either respondents never felt dis-
criminated against or they did. We measure friendship
patterns by comparing respondents reporting that at
least half of their friends are of the respective “other”
group to those who reported a smaller share of native
friends, or alternatively friends with an immigrant back-
ground. Language preferences are measured with a bat-
tery asking the respondents what second language they
speak in different social contexts (see Table A1), if at all.
We used the sum index of the frequency of use across
the three contexts. Respondents reporting not to use
a second language were coded 0. Nationality has three
categories 0 “only survey country nationality,” 1 “only
origin country nationality” and 2 “both.” In Sweden,
none of the respondents reported holding a dual citi-
zenship. To account for the country of origin of the re-
spondents we constructed a regional origin variable in
whichwe grouped countries from substantivelymeaning-
ful regions together that represent themain regions from
which immigrants in England, Germany, the Netherlands
and Sweden arrived. All countries have, for example, a
large share of “Western” mainly European immigrants.
However, while in England Asian immigrants are a rela-
tively large group, in the Netherlands it is the Antilleans.
Both Germany and the Netherlands have a large Turkish
community (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
In addition to the assimilation-related control vari-
ables, we include further variables in the model that
were previously shown to be associated with political in-
terest. First, we included a measure for respondents’ so-
cial activities (participation in associations or clubs) that
have a positive effect on political interest and political
participation (Verba et al., 1995). Attendance of religious
activities serves as an additional proxy for social activi-
ties. Second, we control the reported frequency of talk-
ing about politics at home as a measure of parental influ-
ence that has a large effect on the early development of
political interest (for a review see Jennings et al., 2009).
Finally, we include respondents’ sex because girls have
been found to report being less interested in politics than
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boys already at an early age (Greenstein, 1965; van Deth,
Abendschön, & Vollmar 2011).
The CILS4EU project also collected information from
the respondents’ parents. This information is however
not complete. Due to a large number ofmissing cases,we
decided to exclude parental information from our main
analysis. Still, we corroborated the robustness of our re-
sults by replicating our models including parental educa-
tion (whether they have an university degree) and moth-
ers’ national identification (the results are available in
Table A4 in the Appendix).
Before we test the hypotheses listed above, we
would like to shortly describe the composition of the
sample (the same information is presented in Table A2
in the Appendix only for IIB). The description is based on
the weighted sample (N = 11,747) after listwise deletion
of the missing cases (percentage missing among the in-
dependent variables ranged between 0.5% and 7%; the
depended variable suffered from about 14.5% missing
cases). As indicated in Table 1, in all four countries na-
tives comprise the largest share among the respondents
followed by children of immigrants. In England and the
Netherlands, immigrants make some 3% to 9% of the
sample. The share of respondents with a very strong na-
tional identification is rather high across all countries and
that of ethnic identification much lower. Interest in poli-
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample in the analysis with weights. Source: CILS4EU data.
England Germany The Netherlands Sweden
Political interest (original scale) 2.0 (1.1) 2.8 (1.1) 2.2 (0.99) 2.1 (1.1)
% Strong political interest 25.1% 65.3% 40.9% 32.3%
Immigrant status:
Native 74.9% 76% 85.6% 72.4%
Immigrant 9% 4.4% 3.2% 7.1%
Child of immigrant(s) 15.9% 19.6% 11.2% 20.4%
% Very strong national identification 52.5% 61.4% 58.2% 64.5%
% Very strong ethnic identification 7.5% 7.9% 5.8% 7.3%
Use of second language 0.7 (1.7) 0.9 (1.9) 0.8 (1. 9) 0.9 (1.9)
Nationality:
Only of survey country 85.7% 87.1% 95.8% 96.1%
Only of other country 5.1% 6.3% 3.1% 3.9%
Survey country and other 9.2% 6.6% 1.1%
Mixed friendships:
No 80.7% 79.5% 88% 77.3%
Yes 19.3% 20.5% 12% 22.7%
Discrimination:
No 39.6% 33.7% 72.6% 56.9%
Yes 60.4% 66.3% 27.4% 43%
Talk to parents about politics 2.8 (1.2) 2.9 (1.1) 2.9 (1.2) 2.7 (1.1)
Associationism 2.8 (1.4) 3.2 (1.3) 3.5 (1.1) 3.1 (1.4)
Religious activities:
Less than once a month 81.6% 80.8% 90.1% 90. 65%
At least once a month 18.4% 19.2% 9. 9% 9.4%
Gender:
Male 48% 49% 48.7% 49.9%
Female 52% 51% 51.3% 50.1%
Region of origin:
Africa and Middle East 5.1% 7.3% 3.5% 7.9%
Asia 12.7% 2.3% 3.9% 4%
Latin America and Caribbean 2.6% 1.2% 3% 1.9%
Europe and North America 4.6% 13.2% 4% 13.7%
Survey country 75% 76% 85.6% 72.4%
N 2,562 2,638 3,008 3,539
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tics is highest in Germany with 65% of the sample inter-
ested in politics and lowest in England with about 25% of
the sample.
To put these findings into context we also looked
into several indexes comparing the four countries both in
termsof their integration policies and in termsof political
engagement. In terms of integration policy, theMIPEX in-
dex data from 2012 (Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova,
2015) indicate that the countries are rather similar to
each other. Germany, the Netherlands and England
range between 64 (in NL) and 57 (in the UK) points in
their integration policy index and Sweden has a higher
value of 80 points. This data is in line with Joppke’s ob-
servation that since the mid-2000s European integration
policies are converging (Joppke, 2007). In terms of politi-
cal engagement, norms are different across countries, for
instance, electoral turnout is highest in Sweden followed
by the Netherlands, Germany, and England (for the years
2009 and 2010, as well as 2013 to 2015; International
IDEA, 2019). As indicated in the European Social Survey
data (European Social Survey, 2014) Political interest
differs across countries also, with the highest level in
Germany, and then Sweden, and the Netherlands. The
English show significantly lower levels of political inter-
est (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).
In what follows we present the results of several lo-
gistic regressionmodelswe estimated in order to test the
hypotheses above. Across all models, we pooled the data
from the four countries together and included dummy
variables to be able to estimate country-effects. We also
calculate clustered standard errors because of the clus-
tering of individuals in countries, schools, and classes.
We use Sweden, which has a somewhat higher score on
the integration policy index, as the reference point.
Model 1 in Table 1 serves to test the main relations
between immigrant status and interest in the politics of
the receiving society. Model 2 in the same Table also in-
cludes national identification to test whether this vari-
able significantly predicts political interest. This is a pre-
condition for the nextmodel presented in Figure 1where
we test our third hypothesis about the moderation of na-
tional identification in the relationship tested in model 1.
This model was also estimated with the control vari-
ables namely friendship and language preferences, eth-
nic identification, nationality, region of origin, and dis-
crimination perception as well as political socialization at
home, associationism and gender as can be seen in Table
A5 in the Appendix. Model 3 in Table 1 tests the robust-
ness of the findings from model 1 after adding the same
control variables.
4. Findings
Table 2 presents the results of the logit estimation mod-
els in the form of odds ratios. In model 1, which only in-
cludes the variable immigrant status, we see no signif-
icant differences in the odds of immigrants and of na-
tives to be politically interested. Thus, our first hypoth-
esis that immigrants will show a lower interest in politics
compared with natives finds no empirical support at this
stage. To that, results imply that immigrants and children
of immigrants show higher and not lower odds than na-
tives to be interested in the politics of the survey coun-
try. Our second hypothesis, that differences found be-
tween immigrants and natives will be larger than those
found between children of immigrants and natives was
also not corroborated. Specifically, the results indicate
that it is the children of immigrants who significantly dif-
fer from natives in their political interest and not the im-
migrants.Model 1 also conveys that English respondents’
odds to be politically interested are lower than Swedish
respondents’ odds, whereas German respondents’ odds
to be politically interested are nearly 4 times larger than
those of respondents in Sweden. Among respondents in
the Netherlands, their odds to be politically interested
are 1.49 as large as those of respondents in Sweden.
In model 2 we included our second variable of interest,
namely national identification, which, as expected, posi-
tively predicts interest in the politics of the receiving so-
ciety among the respondents.
Our third hypothesis is the most relevant theoreti-
cally. We expect that the odds of IIBs to be politically
interested will increase as a function of their national
identification (H3). Testing this last expectation requires
adding an interaction term between national identifi-
cation and immigrant status to the models presented
above (see Table A5 in the Appendix for detailed results).
We tested the interaction both in the simplest model
(model 2 in Table 2) and in themodel with all control vari-
ables (model 3 in Table 2). Figure 1 shows the results for
the simpler model which, as we show in the Appendix
(Table A5) did not change much with the inclusion of
the control variables. The findings show that in line with
our hypothesis, national identification moderates the re-
lation between immigrant status and political interest.
Specifically, Figure 1 shows that among IIBs the probabil-
ity to be interested in the politics of the receiving coun-
try increases as national identification becomes stronger.
The effect is particularly large for immigrant respondents
for which the probability to be interested in politics dou-
bles, increasing from38% for thosewith not a very strong
national identification to 62% for those that identify very
strongly (see Figure 1). Among children of immigrants,
the larger difference in the probability to be politically
interested is found between those who do not identify
nationally at all or not very strongly (38%) and those
who identify somewhat strongly (55%). Corroborating
the uncertainty hypothesis, we do not see the same ef-
fect among natives who, we contend, are unlikely to suf-
fer from uncertainty in their national groupmembership.
We also tested these results using a formal (lin-
com) test (Buis, 2010) which showed that children of
immigrants who identified “somewhat strongly” were
1.5 timesmore likely to be interested in the politics of the
receiving society compared to those who did not iden-
tify nationally (or identified “not at all strongly”). Among
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Table 2. Odds ratios (robust SE) from the pooled logit model predicting the probabilities to report interest in politics of the
survey country (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2 M3
Immigrant 1.11 1.25 0.79
(0.16) (0.18) (0.20)
Child of immigrant(s) 1.21** 1.29*** 0.73
(0.11) (0.12) (0.14)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very) 1.40** 1.25
(0.19) (0.18)
National identification (very strongly) 1.47*** 1.33**
(0.19) (0.19)
England 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.58***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Germany 3.97*** 4.04*** 4.40***
(0.31) (0.31) (0.40)
The Netherlands 1.49*** 1.49*** 1.38***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly) 1.02
(0.18)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly 1.25
(0.27)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly 1.17
(0.21)
Girl 0.55***
(0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other 0.79
(0.15)
Citizenship = only other country 0.80
(0.15)
Political discussion at home 2.28***
(0.09)
Mixed friendships 1.43**
(0.21)
Use of second language 1.00
(0.03)
Associationism 1.08**
(0.03)
Religious activities 1.22***
(0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often 1.00
(0.01)
Africa and the Middle East 1.81***
(0.33)
Asia 1.75***
(0.34)
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.27
(0.36)
Constant 0.45*** 0.32*** 0.02***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations 11,747 11,747 11,747
AIC 1150879 1148772 962484.7
Log pseudolikelihood −575433.36 −574377.87 −481219.35
Notes: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of being interested in the politics of the survey country according to strength of national
identification and immigrant status. Note: Estimates based on model 1 in Table A5 in the Appendix. Source: CILS4EU data;
own analysis.
immigrants, the difference was at 0.87. To the contrary,
immigrants who identified “very strongly” with their re-
spective survey country were 2.14 times more likely to
be interested in its politics compared to immigrants with
low or no national identification at all, whereas this dif-
ference was at 1.31 for children of immigrants. Due to
the relatively similar integration policies in the four coun-
tries under scrutiny, we have not developed hypothe-
ses regarding possible country differences in the interac-
tion between national identification and immigrant sta-
tus. Results from country-specific estimations of the in-
teraction effect (see Figure A2 in the Appendix) indicate
however that the moderation effect of national identifi-
cation on the probabilities of IIBs and natives to be po-
litically interested differs across the countries, in particu-
lar among children of immigrants, and natives. The one
common trend is that among immigrants the probabil-
ity to be politically interested increases with levels of na-
tional identification.
Before we move on the conclusions section, we
would like to point out a few additional results from
model 3 in Table 2 (and model 2 in Table A5 in the
Appendix). We will not describe all results in detail here,
but a few of the findings do deserve our attention. The
first noteworthy finding in model 3 is the change in the
direction of the immigrant status coefficients which are,
however, not statistically significant at the 0.10 level
(they are, in model 2 in Table A5). Regarding our second
main variable of interest, national identification, the re-
sults confirm again that a stronger national identification
implies higher levels of political interest. The country dif-
ferences observed inmodels 1 and 2 hold also inmodel 3.
In line with previous research, model 3 shows that re-
spondents whose parents discuss politics at home have
twice the odds to be politically interested than respon-
dents whose parents do not talk about politics at home.
We also see that boys have twice the odds that girls do to
be politically interested. Associationism and religious ac-
tivities also increase the odds of being interested in the
politics of the survey country. Similarly, respondentswith
mixed friendships have higher odds to be politically inter-
ested than respondents with homogeneous friendship
ties. We understand this result in line with the positive
effect of heterogeneous networks (Granovetter, 1973).
Other assimilation-related predictors were less relevant
for the respondents’ interest in the receiving society’s
politics. Finally, model 3 conveys that among respon-
dents from African, Middle Eastern, and Asian origin, the
odds to be interested in the politics of the receiving-
country are higher than among natives and individuals
with a European origin. Table A6 in the Appendix show
the samemodels for IIB only, where one can also see that
differences in political interest between immigrants and
children of immigrants are not statistically significant.
5. Conclusions and Outlook
As diversity in European societies rises, understand-
ing whether and how new immigrant groups and their
descendants assimilate becomes increasingly relevant.
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Within this context, we focus our attention on the issue
of political interest, a key determinant of political assim-
ilation, which until now remained understudied. We in-
vestigate political interest among youth in four European
immigrant-receiving countries. Our focus on youth al-
lows us to learn about the emergence of political inter-
est, which according to the literature develops in adoles-
cence. In particular, we look into the relations between
political interest and national identification, another per-
sonality element that develops during this stage in the
life-course, among individuals with and without an immi-
grant background.We first investigated whether interest
in the politics of the receiving society differs between na-
tives, children of immigrants and immigrants. Second,we
tested whether such differences can be explained by dif-
ferential levels of national identification. The assumption
here was that due to their identity uncertainty, IIBs will
show higher political interest as their national identifica-
tion becomes stronger.
As mentioned elsewhere in the article, we did not
attempt to solve the causal debate regarding the rela-
tions between national identification and political inter-
est. Instead, we used data from the second wave of the
CILS4EU to investigate the relations between assimila-
tion and interest in the politics of the survey country, as-
suming that national identification is an important pre-
dictor of it. Interest in the politics of the receiving country
was only measured twice in the CILS4EU project cross-
nationally, limiting our possibilities to measure its long-
term relationship with national identification. An obvi-
ous extension of this project is thus to use the longitudi-
nal version of the CILS4EU in Germany, where the ques-
tion was included in further waves. Furthermore, a ques-
tion could be raised as to the potential of class or school-
level information that is available in the CILS4EU data, of
which we made no use. Regarding the sample, it is im-
portant to note that the data covers a highly selective
set of countries in Europewhich warns caution regarding
generalizing the conclusions to other countries. Future
research should thus try to include more countries and
consider macro-level mechanisms to account for differ-
ences between them.
Notwithstanding its limitations, the current study is a
first and necessary step that provides important insights
into immigrants’ political assimilation. The findings pre-
sented above indicate first that national identification,
defined as a sense of attachment to the in-group, is an
importantmechanism that positively contributes to polit-
ical interest among youth in Europe. Given that democra-
cies require, by definition, citizens’ political participation,
and that political interest is a prerequisite of such partici-
pation, our findings indicate that European democracies
would be smart in exploring potential ways to increase
national identification among young persons. After all,
whether they develop political interest–or not—at an
early age will determine their future participatory behav-
ior and among others their electoral turn-out.
Second, our findings show that the relevance of na-
tional identification for political interest differs between
natives and IIBs. Two issues arise from this result: first,
considering the importance of developing national iden-
tification among young people, this finding speaks for
the fact that nations compete with a long list of other
social groups with which youth, and particularly native
youth identifies. Thus, the task of increasing this iden-
tification among them should not be underestimated.
Second, considering the stronger association between
national identification and political interest among im-
migrants, we believe this finding supports previous indi-
cations for the assimilation of immigrants in European
societies. Moreover, it shows how the attachment of im-
migrants to the receiving society increases their chances
to be interested in its politics. This finding thus indicates
that national identification of immigrants holds an impor-
tant key for sustaining democracy in more than one way.
By increasing national identification among immigrants,
and to some extent also children of immigrants, receiv-
ing societies in Europe may foster their political partici-
pation and increase democratization in their highly diver-
sified societies. Moreover, by providing immigrants the
opportunity to raise their voice in politics, democracies
can become more equalitarian. Hochman (2011) finds in
this context that party identification increases the odds
of IIBs in Germany to report intentions of naturalization.
Finally, the country-differences we observe in our
data remain to be explained. Although this is a goal that
goes beyond the scope of this article, our first interpre-
tation refers to the important role of the prestige of po-
litical interest as a norm of citizenship in each country
on the one hand, and the openness of the political sys-
tem to immigrants in terms of assimilation on the other.
While national identification matters little for the politi-
cal interest of young people in Sweden, it matters signif-
icantly in Germany. In addition, in Germany political in-
terest is relatively high. The combination of both factors
could explain why in Germany those immigrants or chil-
dren of immigrants that are politically interested are the
ones motivated due to their positive identification with
the country and their willingness to assimilate. This is a
speculation that requires further analysis and provides a
future venue for research.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of variables and how they were measured.
Variable Original item Final measure
Political
interest
How interested are you in survey country’s politics?
(1) very much (5) very little or not at all
(0) Not interested (1) Interested
Immigrant
status
Generated CILS4EU variable (1) Immigrants (2) Children of immigrants
(0) Other and native
National
identification
How strongly do you feel [survey country member]
(1) very strongly to (5) not at all strongly
(1) not at all, not strongly (2) Fairly
strongly (3) very strongly
Ethnic
identification
How strongly do you feel you belong to [group 1] (1) very
strongly to (5) not at all strongly
(1) not at all, not strongly (2) Fairly
strongly (3) very strongly
Friendship
patterns
Thinking now about all of your friends. How many of them
have a [survey country] background
(0) half or more of friends same group
(1) half or more of friends other group
Language
preferences
Is there a language other than <survey country language>
spoken at your home? In this language, how often do you:
Talk to your family, watch TV, talk to your friends
Sum scale among those who reported
“yes” to other language spoken at home
Subjective
discrimination
(Round 1)
How often feel discriminated against or treated unfairly/
In the last 12 month felt discriminated in: school;
trains/buses/trams/subways; shops/stores/cafés/
restaurants/ nightclubs;by police or security guards
(1) always to (4) never
(0) never felt discriminated (1) Felt
discriminated rarely or more often
Nationality
(Round 1)
What is your nationality (which country is your passport
from)? If you have more than one nationality, please tick
all that apply (1) Only survey country, (2) survey country
and other, (3) only other
Same as original item
Political
discussions at
home
In general, how often does/do one or both of your parents
do the following things with you? talk to you about
political and social issues (1) every day to (5) never
Same as original item
Associationism In your spare time how often spend time in a
sports/music/drama/other club (1) every day to (5) never
Same as original item
Religious
participation
How often do you visit a religious meeting place (e.g., a
church, mosque, synagogue or temple)? (1) never to
(5) every day
Same as original item
Girl Are you a boy or a girl (1) and (2) respectively (0) boy (1) girl
Region of
origin
Generated SILC4EU variable Africa and Middle-East; Asia; South
America and the Carribean; Europe
North-America and Oceania; Survey
country
Social Inclusion, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 257–278 269
Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the sample in the analysis with weights (immigrants and children of immigrants only).
England Germany The Netherlands Sweden
Political interest (original scale) 2.1 (1.1) 2.7 (1.2) 2.6 (1.0) 2.2 (1.1)
% Strong political interest 29.7% 60.6% 62.3% 40.2%
Immigrant status:
Immigrant 36.2% 18.3% 22.3% 25.8%
Child of immigrant 63.8% 81.7% 77.7% 74.2%
% Very strong National identification 28% 31.9% 21.9% 26.8%
% Very strong Ethnic identification 23.6% 26.9% 26.6% 22.7%
Use of second language 2.4 (2.6) 3.4 (2.6) 2.6 (2.7) 3.0 (2.6)
Nationality:
Only of survey country 47.7% 49.8% 73.4% 85.8%
Only of other country 17.2% 22.9% 19.3% 14.2%
Survey country and other 35.1% 27.3% 7.3% —
Mixed friendships:
No 29.9% 23% 20.5% 24%
Yes 70.1% 77% 79.5% 76%
% experienced discrimination 61.1% 61.5% 36.2% 44.6%
Talk to parents about politics 2.9 (1.2) 2.8 (1.2) 3.0 (1.2) 2.8 (1.2)
Associationism 2.8 (1.3) 3.0 (1.4) 3.1 (1.4) 2.9 (1.4)
Religious participation:
Less than once a month 63.3% 71.6% 77.5% 85.3%
At least once a month 36.7% 28.4% 22.5% 14.7%
Gender:
Boy 47.7% 44.9% 44.7% 50.6%
Girl 52.3% 55.1% 55.3% 49.4%
Country of origin:
Africa and the Middle East 20.38% 30.6% 24.4% 28.6%
Asia 50.8% 9.5% 27.4% 14.6%
South America and the Caribbean 10.5% 5% 20.5% 7%
Europe and north America 18.3% 54.8% 27.7% 49.7%
N 993 1113 850 1481
Source: CILS4EU
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Table A3. Code for country of origin.
England Germany Netherlands Sweden
Africa and Middle Nigeria, West Africa, North Africa, Morocco North Africa,
East (+Turkey) Lebanon Lebanon, Iraq, Syria,
Iran
East Africa Other Africa Africa
Other Africa East Africa, Somalia
Other Africa
Asia South Asia, East Asia South Asia, South Asia, Indonesia South Asia,
Southeast Asia
Pakistan, India, West Asia West Asia West Asia
Bangladesh
other Asia other Asia other Asia other Asia
Latin America and Latin America and the Latin America Latin America and the Latin America and
the Caribbean Caribbean, Caribbean and the Caribbean, Surinam, the Caribbean
Caribbean Antilleans
Europe, North North America and North America North America and Oceania North America and
America and Oceania and Oceania Oceania
Oceania
East Europe East Europe, FSU, Poland, Former Yugoslavia East Europe
east Europe, Former
Yugoslavia, Poland
South Europe South Europe, South Europe South Europe
Italy, Greece
Finland, Denmark,
Norway
Other Europe, Ireland Other Europe, West Europe
Missing Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
Survey country Survey country Survey country Survey country Survey country
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Table A4. Odds ratios (robust SE) from the pooled logit model predicting the probabilities to report interest in politics of
the survey country with parental information (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2 M3
Immigrant 0.33** 0.36** 0.35**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Child of immigrant(s) 0.38** 0.39** 0.40**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very) 0.98 0.98 0.96
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
National identification (strongly) 1.15 1.12 1.12
(0.29) (0.27) (0.28)
Immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly 2.24* 2.12 2.21*
(1.07) (0.99) (1.05)
Immigrant * national identification very strongly 2.57* 2.48* 2.53*
(1.37) (1.30) (1.34)
Child of immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly 2.62** 2.53** 2.57**
(1.04) (1.00) (1.02)
Child of immigrant * national identification very strongly 1.84 1.85 1.82
(0.73) (0.73) (0.72)
England 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.66***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Germany 4.65*** 4.31*** 4.82***
(0.52) (0.47) (0.57)
the Netherlands 1.54*** 1.34** 1.59***
(0.21) (0.17) (0.22)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly) 0.94 0.95 0.94
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly 1.22 1.20 1.21
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly 1.09 1.09 1.08
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
Girl 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.48***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other 0.76 0.78 0.77
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Citizenship = only other country 0.84 0.84 0.86
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Political discussion at home 2.17*** 2.23*** 2.18***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Mixed friendships 1.38* 1.41* 1.39*
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27)
Use of second language 1.01 1.01 1.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Associationism 1.02 1.04 1.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Religious activities 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.24***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often 0.91 0.91 0.91
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Africa and Middle East 1.38 1.43 1.41
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Asia 2.10** 2.09** 2.01**
(0.61) (0.61) (0.58)
Latin America and Caribbean 0.93 1.00 0.93
(0.34) (0.38) (0.34)
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Table A4. (Cont.) Odds ratios (robust SE) from the pooled logit model predicting the probabilities to report interest in
politics of the survey country with parental information (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own
analysis.
M1 M2 M3
National identification mother somewhat strongly 1.12 1.14
(0.19) (0.19)
National identification mother very strongly 1.19 1.25
(0.21) (0.22)
Parents academics 1.42*** 1.44***
(0.17) (0.18)
Constant 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 7,700 7,700 7,700
AIC 678831.7 680908.6 678364.9
Log pseudolikelihood −339387.83 −340425.32 −339152.44
Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
TableA5.Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondentswith interaction effects (weighted sample, listwise
deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2
Immigrant 0.77 0.50*
(0.24) (0.19)
Child of immigrant(s) 0.78 0.45***
(0.19) (0.13)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very) 0.99 0.88
(0.20) (0.18)
National identification (strongly) 1.11 1.00
(0.21) (0.19)
Immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly 1.63 1.75
(0.61) (0.64)
Immigrant * national identification very strongly 2.83*** 2.34**
(1.12) (1.00)
Child of immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly 2.11*** 2.19**
(0.59) (0.67)
Child of immigrant * national identification very strongly 1.46 1.56
(0.41) (0.50)
England 0.72*** 0.58***
(0.06) (0.06)
Germany 4.09*** 4.43***
(0.32) (0.40)
the Netherlands 1.50*** 1.38***
(0.14) (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly) 1.03
(0.18)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly 1.23
(0.26)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly 1.16
(0.21)
Girl 0.55***
(0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other 0.82
(0.15)
Citizenship = only other country 0.84
(0.16)
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Table A5. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents with interaction effects (weighted sample,
listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2
Political discussion at home 2.28***
(0.09)
Mixed friendships 1.36**
(0.20)
Use of second language 0.10
(0.03)
Associationism 1.08**
(0.03)
Religious activities 1.23***
(0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often 1.00
(0.09)
Africa and Middle East 1.81***
(0.33)
Asia 1.68***
(0.33)
Latin America and Caribbean 1.231
(0.35)
Constant 0.42*** 0.03***
(0.08) (0.01)
Observations 11,747 11,747
AIC 1146178 960698.1
Log pseudolikelihood −573077.17 −480322.03
Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A6. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among individuals with an immigrant background (weighted sample,
listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2 M3
Immigrant 0.87 0.94 1.06
(0.13) (0.14) (0.17)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very) 1.63*** 1.60***
(0.26) (0.28)
National identification (strongly) 1.64*** 1.46*
(0.28) (0.30)
England 0.64*** 0.63*** 0.40***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Germany 2.26*** 2.36*** 2.55***
(0.28) (0.30) (0.39)
the Netherlands 2.45*** 2.34*** 2.12***
(0.47) (0.45) (0.44)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly) 1.09
(0.20)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly 0.82
(0.22)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly 0.90
(0.16)
Girl 0.58***
(0.08)
Citizenship = survey country and other 1.06
(0.20)
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Table A6. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among individuals with an immigrant background (weighted
sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2 M3
Citizenship = only other country 1.08
(0.20)
Political discussion at home 1.88***
(0.10)
Mixed friendships 1.62***
(0.25)
Use of second language 1.00
(0.03)
Associationism 1.06
(0.05)
Religious activities 1.30***
(0.08)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often 0.95
(0.12)
Africa and Middle East 1.70***
(0.29)
Asia 1.58**
(0.31)
Latin America and Caribbean 1.06
(0.30)
Constant 0.70*** 0.47*** 0.03***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.01)
Observations 4,437 4,437 4,437
AIC 273654.9 271637.5 235569.9
Log pseudolikelihood −136822.47 −135811.74 −117762.97
Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A7. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with alter-
native immigrant status coding. source: CILS4EU; own analysis.
M1 M2 M3
Immigrants 1.11 1.27 0.83
(0.16) (0.19) (0.22)
Immigrant offspring 1.22** 1.30*** 0.77
(0.10) (0.11) (0.16)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very) 1.39** 1.23
(0.19) (0.18)
National identification (strongly) 1.48*** 1.33**
(0.20) (0.19)
England 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.58***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Germany 4.00*** 4.07*** 4.46***
(0.31) (0.32) (0.40)
the Netherlands 1.49*** 1.49*** 1.38***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly) 1.05
(0.19)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly 1.22
(0.26)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly 1.16
(0.21)
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Table A7. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with
alternative immigrant status coding. source: CILS4EU; own analysis.
M1 M2 M3
Girl 0.54***
(0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other 0.78
(0.14)
Citizenship = only other country 0.78
(0.15)
Political discussion at home 2.27***
(0.09)
Mixed friendships 1.44**
(0.22)
Use of second language 1.00
(0.03)
Associationism 1.08**
(0.03)
Religious activities 1.22***
(0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often 1.01
(0.09)
Africa and Middle East 1.78***
(0.31)
Asia 1.75***
(0.32)
Latin America and Caribbean 1.23
(0.32)
Constant 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.02***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations 11,612 11,612 11,612
AIC 1136762 1134558 951725.8
Log pseudolikelihood −568375.05 −567270.92 −475839.89
Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Table A8. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with alter-
native immigrant status coding. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2
Immigrants 0.75 0.50*
(0.24) (0.20)
Immigrant offspring 0.76 0.47**
(0.19) (0.15)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very) 0.94 0.85
(0.20) (0.19)
National identification (strongly) 1.07 0.97
(0.22) (0.20)
Immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly 1.71 1.79
(0.66) (0.67)
Immigrant * national identification very strongly 2.92*** 2.37**
(1.18) (1.03)
Immigrant offspring * national identification somewhat strongly 2.11*** 2.06**
(0.60) (0.63)
Immigrant offspring * national identification very strongly 1.56 1.61
(0.44) (0.50)
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Table A8. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with
alternative immigrant status coding. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
M1 M2
England 0.72*** 0.58***
(0.06) (0.06)
Germany 4.12*** 4.47***
(0.32) (0.41)
the Netherlands 1.50*** 1.38***
(0.14) (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly) 1.07
(0.19)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly 1.19
(0.26)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly 1.15
(0.20)
Girl 0.54***
(0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other 0.81
(0.15)
Citizenship = only other country 0.83
(0.16)
Political discussion at home 2.26***
(0.09)
Mixed friendships 1.38**
(0.21)
Use of second language 1.00
(0.03)
Associationism 1.08**
(0.03)
Religious activities 1.23***
(0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often 1.01
(0.09)
Africa and Middle East 1.77***
(0.31)
Asia 1.69***
(0.31)
Latin America and Caribbean 1.21
(0.32)
Constant 0.43*** 0.03***
(0.09) (0.01)
Observations 11,612 11,612
AIC 1132060 950205.9
Log pseudolikelihood −566018.23 −475075.93
Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure A1. Politically interested respondents in survey country (percentage). Comparison of political interest between
European Social Survey data from 2012 and the CILS4EU data; own analysis. Note: In the ESS the United Kingdom is studied
and not England.
Sweden
Germany
The Netherlands
England
Figure A2. Predicted probabilities of being interested in the politics of the survey country according to strength of national
identification and immigrant status. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.
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